INTRODUCTION
The article explores two pieces of legislation on the status of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, namely, the Israeli Basic Law on Jerusalem passed in 1980 and amended in 2000, and the US Congress Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995.
The questions with which I approach these texts are those of a scholar of religion.1 These laws interest me precisely because they are of a largely symbolic nature that sheds light on the value of symbols in modern law, policy, and politics. In my view, they attest to the persistence of religious symbols and their permutations in modern, ostensibly secular, politics.
My overall impression is threefold: 1) Both pieces of legislation are of a symbolic nature-they are political declarations in the form of law. 2) As statements expressing a widely shared consensus, they convert a kind of oral tradition into written law. 3) By adding the force of written law to a previously held, widely shared assumption, they create a normative, prescriptive momentum that goes beyond the wording of the declaration itself. Thus, the act of converting a widely shared consensus into a written law, even a "basic law" of constitutional status, binds the community that shared the prior consensus to a greater degree than the prior consensus.2
Writing a broadly held assumption into law thus binds and obliges the political community in significant ways. It changes the status quo even where it merely affirms it in writing, and it signals a watershed moment of "confession" that may be compared to a kind of collective conversion experience. In both cases, but especially in the case of the Jerusalem Basic Law, its introduction and passage into law is tied to the fear of a significant erosion of the prior consensus and hence acts as a call to a renewed commitment to values and assumptions in which a significant sector of society seemed to lose interest or in regard to which-when pressed-the public began to change its mind. The "Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel" was largely meant for internal consumption where it aimed to strengthen unity and resolve. As anticipated by some of the lawmakers, the response of the international community to the law was swift and overwhelmingly critical. It is characteristic of its moment in history that the legislature, which passed the law nearly unanimously, was fully aware of these potentially grave foreign policy consequences but nevertheless felt compelled to stand behind it, making this an interesting object of study also from the perspective of political psychology.
The Jerusalem Basic Law of 1980 states that "Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel." The US Congress Jerusalem Embassy Act, passed 15 years later, mandates the US Department of State to move the US embassy to Jerusalem and declares that "(1) Jerusalem should remain an undivided city in which the rights of every ethnic and religious group are protected;" and "(2) Jerusalem should be recognized as the capital of the State of Israel."3
What is at stake in both of these legislative acts is the legal status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and its "unity", indicating that these laws (as well as their antecedents and/or amendments) were passed-though by different legislative bodies-with a view to impending threats of a redivision of Jerusalem that loomed large at certain moments when the future of the city was seriously considered in the context of bilateral negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors brokered by the US directly or as part of an international coalition. The first time this threat was looming was during the US-brokered negotiations between Israel and Egypt on Palestinian autonomy. The second time this threat was looming was during what, according to the ambitious agenda then on the table, were supposed to be comprehensive final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority held at Camp David in 2000. Both rounds of negotiation ended without breakthrough agreements and both were hampered in part by the Jerusalem question, which continues to remain unresolved. 4 In both cases, the Jerusalem Basic Law of 1980 and the 1995 Jerusalem Embassy Act, we are dealing with political declarations in the form of a law. Both were passed by a significant majority of votes, despite all misgivings lawmakers expressed during the antecedent debates.5 Both laws expressed views and opinions that were widely shared among the senators, representatives, and members of Knesset and the people they represented, and perhaps even by some who voted against these laws. And yet both laws were highly controversial because of their timing and because of political and legal implications of putting in writing what had been previously agreed on as a matter of course. 6 The Jerusalem Basic Law of 1980 caused international consternation and condemnation of Israel's actions in regard to Arab East-Jerusalem, the part of the city conquered in June 1967 and since integrated into an expanded municipality and in effect annexed by the State of Israel. Perceived as a provocation and an affront against international law and the will of the international community, as expressed in UN Resolution 242 (1967) and later resolutions,7 and specifically as a poke-in-the-eye of Israel's partners in peace, President Anwar al-Sadat and President Jimmy Carter, the Basic Law imperiled the peace treaty with Egypt concluded in 1979 and negatively impacted the ongoing negotiations between Israel and Egypt on Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza. UN Security Council Resolution 478 explicitly censored Israel for adopting the Jerusalem Basic Law and what it regarded as Israel's non-compliance with prior Security Council resolutions, prompting the thirteen countries who, after 1967, had continued to maintain their embassies in Jerusalem, to withdraw them in 1980.
THE JERUSALEM EMBASSY ACT OF 1995
The Jerusalem Embassy Act, introduced by then-Senators Bob Dole and Jon Kyl (originally known as the Dole-Kyl-Bill),8 accentuated the tension between conservative members of Congress and the pro-Israel lobby on the one hand and the Clinton Administration on the other hand, similar to tensions that had arisen between Congress and the first President Bush's administration that had led to the non-binding antecedent of the Embassy Act, introduced in 1990.9 This tension between US Congress and the Administration is ongoing.10
To those unaware of the debates on the legal status of Jerusalem in international law, and especially to Americans who take it for granted that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, the Jerusalem Embassy Act offers the surprising insight that the United States of America does not officially, unambiguously, or uniformly recognize the city of Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel. This law, and the wrangling between two of the three constitutional powers that it represents, is also an excellent exercise in American politics. The official position of the US Government on the status of Jerusalem-the city Israel, one of its staunchest allies, regards as its capital-is that it is subject to final status agreements between Israel and the Palestinians and that, until these are reached, Jerusalem's status continues to be ruled de jure by the 1947 UN Partition Resolution, which designated the municipality as part of a larger corpus separatum under an international regime. It is not entirely clear, however, why despite the Embassy Act of 1995 no administration, Democrat and Republican alike, has felt compelled to move the US embassy to Jerusalem, as the US does indeed recognize West-Jerusalem as the de facto capital of Israel.
To specialists who are fully aware of the debates on the legal status of Jerusalem in international law, something else is noteworthy about the Jerusalem Embassy Act, namely, the fact that it fails to make reference to the 1980 Israeli "Basic Law: Jerusalem, the Capital of Israel". Instead, the Jerusalem Embassy Act invokes certain facts on the ground as "findings" in order to justify the stipulation that the US should officially recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. These facts on the ground are an interesting and complex list made up of historical facts, prior US policy statements on Jerusalem, and a few more general comments that indicate a widely shared American consensus regarding the status and character of Jerusalem as Israel's capital.
Two types of findings are particularly noteworthy, namely arguments on what is "normal" in international relations, and arguments pertaining to the particular situation of Jerusalem. Arguments of the first kind are that countries are free to choose their capital cities and that the US, like any other country, usually locate their embassy in the city that the host country chooses as the seat of its government. Arguments of the second kind include a reference to the fact that Jerusalem has served as Israel's capital since 1950, a mention of Jerusalem's spiritual value to Judaism, and the claim that it is only since 1967, i.e., with the beginning of Israeli rule over the Old City and its holy places, that religious freedom has been maintained, in contrast to restrictions on access to holy places that obtained in the years of Jordanian rule over East Jerusalem.
The list foregrounds Jewish spiritual attachments to the holy city, going beyond the rationale included in the findings of H. Con. Res. 290 (1990), the non-binding resolution that set the legislative precedent for the Embassy Act. This resolution, passed at the time of the Madrid Conference, when the Bush Administration openly referred to the neighborhoods Israel had built in East Jerusalem since 1967 as "settlements", emphasized freedom of access to the holy places, stating that until 1967 "Israeli citizens of all faiths were not permitted access to holy sites in the area controlled by Jordan."11 Senate Concurrent Resolution 106 (1990) simply affirmed "that Jerusalem must remain an undivided city in which the rights of every ethnic religious group are protected", without naming any specific "ethnic religious" as particularly threatened, nor specified the kinds of rights in question.
None of the facts listed as "findings" in section 2 of the 1995 Embassy Act have the force of law, and the one law that could have been invoked, the Jerusalem Basic Law of 1980, is not mentioned. The Embassy Act obliquely refers to acts of the Israeli Knesset proclaimed in late 1949 and early 1950 that laid claim to "Jerusalem, the eternal" as Israel's capital, but it does not invoke any specific Israeli legislation in order to determine why Jerusalem should be officially recognized by the US as the capital of Israel without waiting for the outcome of final status negotiations, as has been the official US position since 1967, and really since 1948. Instead, the US Congress draws on various types of opinions, perceptions, and precedents to put pressure on the Administration to change its long-standing policy in regard to limiting its diplomatic representation in Jerusalem.
The Embassy Act leaves many questions open and unaddressed. It does not address what territory it refers to when it says of Jerusalem that it "should remain an undivided city"; it does not specify the ethnic and religious groups that constitute the populations of Jerusalem and it does not explain who will be in charge of the protection of their rights. The clause that stipulates the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital does not rule out the possibility that Jerusalem could also serve as the capital of a Palestinian state. The fact that the Embassy Act refers back to Jerusalem's status as Israel's capital as a fact prevailing since 1950 implies the possibility that, in the future, West Jerusalem could continue to serve as Israel's capital, while East Jerusalem could host the institutions of a sovereign Palestinian state. That the city should remain undivided was also stipulated, though limited to a municipal and functional unity, in one of the letters written by Anwar al-Sadat following the conclusion of the Camp David Agreement of 1978. Thus, the Jerusalem Embassy Act does not explicitly mandate the US Government to take a stand on the future of Jerusalem, as determined by final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.
However, the message this law sent to the Clinton Administration and that Congress has repeatedly affirmed ever since, is strong and clear in its intention, an intention that differs from that expressed in the 1990 antecedent resolutions of the 101st Congress, and hence indicates a shift in emphasis from the rhetoric of freedom for all religions to the particular consideration of Jewish rights and sentiments. This, I believe, is the significance of the emphasis, in the 1995 Act's findings, on Jerusalem's character as "the spiritual center of Judaism", as well as the fact that it considers the attachment of "the members of other religious faiths" to the holy city as secondary to that of the Jews. In this regard, US legislation concerning Jerusalem, now more than in the past, echoes the language of the 1917 Balfour Declaration which, without mentioning Jerusalem, spoke of His Majesty's support for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, whereby "Nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." This bifurcation between Jewish rights on the one hand and "the civil and religious rights" of "non-Jewish communities" was not part of the language of the 1990 resolution on Jerusalem, but it is has been written into US law since 1995.
To be sure, Congress left a safety valve in place and provided the Presidency with the option of signing a waiver, invoking unspecified national security reasons. This waiver has been diligently produced by every sitting US President every six months, as required by the Embassy Act, which is the reason the US embassy is still located in Tel-Aviv.
THE 1980 ISR AELI BASIC LAW INTRODUCED BY MK GEULAH COHEN
The 1980 Israeli Basic Law: "Jerusalem, Capital of Israel" is vague, short on detail, and redundant in its specifics, all of which were the subject of prior Israeli legislation. It did not change, or mandate any change, but merely affirmed Jerusalem's status quo as Israel's capital. Though it underscores and writes into law the intention for Jerusalem to be "complete and united", the Jerusalem Basic Law does not define the territorial boundaries of Jerusalem, nor does it define its major terms ("complete", "united"). The major provisions of the law reiterate other Basic Laws with regard to Jerusalem serving as the seat of the government and its major institutions and repeat stipulations of a 1967 ordinance regarding the protection of holy places.
To understand this law better, it helps to compare it with the bill on which it was based. The "Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel" that was passed after several readings deviates in interesting ways from the draft bill that MK Geulah Cohen had introduced for consideration on 14 May 1980, as a member of the opposition Tehiyah party, which represented the interests of the Gush Emunim settler movement.
The original bill reads as follows:12 However, many of those who participated in the lively debates at the time found the law needless and redundant, as well as its timing unfortunate and its impact potentially damaging to Israel's reputation and to the ongoing peace process. The final version, which was overwhelmingly voted into law even by those who would have preferred for there not to be such a law at all, is in some respects less explicit than the original draft and therefore fails to write into law the more far-reaching political assertion that led to its introduction. The annexation of East-to West-Jerusalem and the post-1967 borders of the city are no longer explicitly mentioned. In other respects the Basic Law is more explicit, such as when it reiterates Israel's commitment to the protection of the holy places (though without specifics). It thus neither wrote the status quo into law, as MK Geulah Cohen had intended, nor put in terms of a law the Jewish historical and religious sentiments on which the lawmakers agreed but left unspoken, and hence it left the final status of Jerusalem open and unresolved, except in the vaguest of terms.
THE "BASIC LAW: JERUSALEM, CAPITAL OF ISR AEL" IN DETAIL
The Jerusalem Basic Law passed in July 1980 consists of four paragraphs, to which an amendment, passed in 2000, added two further clauses and a stipulation.
Paragraph 1 states that "Jerusalem, complete ‫)השלמה(‬ and united ‫,)והמאוחדת(‬ is the capital of Israel."
The intent of the law is clear, even though it is not clearly stated: in the opinion of the lawmakers, Jerusalem had been legally reunited in 1967 and it is this reunited city that is meant to be preserved. At the same time, the law fails to specify what it means by the "complete" city of Jerusalem, which municipal boundaries are to be used as a point of reference, and how to account for possible revisions of these boundaries, such as the westward municipal expansion of 1993. There are also many misgivings about the extent to which Jerusalem has been "united", as it is obvious that in many respects Israel failed to integrate the Arab population of Jerusalem into the fabric of Israeli society or even into the municipality of the city. 13 It is difficult to avoid the impression that the intention of the Israeli government in 1967, in 1980, and ever since was not to integrate the Arab population of East Jerusalem into Israeli society, but rather to assert sovereignty over East Jerusalem, specifically over the Jewish Quarter of the Old City, over the Jewish cemetery on Mount Olives, and the historic City of David, underneath the village of Silwan, as well as over other places of particular Jewish historical or religious concern.
The lack of concern with the integration of East Jerusalem's non-Jewish population into the fabric of Israeli society is evident from the many exceptions and special arrangements made for the Arabs of East Jerusalem since 1967. Among these many respects in which Israel has made exceptions and effectively forestalled unification is the school system, where the Jordanian and later the Palestinian school books and exams prevailed and the Israeli curriculum was never introduced; the extension of residency but not citizenship to the Arabs of East Jerusalem, leaving them exposed to the possibility of losing their residency status due to extended absences; the use of Jordanian currency; the lack of proper registration of properties, housing development, infrastructure, and other services; and other vital measures of unification of the constituent communities of the city. In this regard the law does not state a fact, and the sense or degree to which it establishes a goal for future development is unclear.
Paragraph 2 states facts in the form of a basic law that had been in place since late 1950, as also noted in the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, and notionally dated from the very inception of the State of Israel, though their implementation had initially been delayed by reasons of war, namely, that "Jerusalem is the seat of the President of the State, the Knesset, the Government and the Supreme Court."
Paragraph 2 in no way impacts on the status quo of Jerusalem, and one may wonder, as some who debated the law did, whether writing something into law that had hitherto been taken for granted does not call into the question the legitimacy of the status quo ante. Furthermore, the stipulations made in this paragraph had been the subject of prior "basic laws" concerning the seat of the presidency, the Knesset, the Government, and Supreme Court, rendering the paragraph redundant from a legal perspective. It is possible that the lawmakers felt the need to preserve some of the language introduced by Geulah Cohen as they deprived her bill of other, more aggressive stipulations.
Paragraph 3 speaks to the protection of the Holy Places. "The Holy Places shall be protected from desecration ‫)חלול(‬ and any other violation and from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings towards those places."
Obviously this is one of the more complicated statements of the law.14 There is no generally agreed list of places holy to the major communities of Jerusalem, though there are lists that are used as a reference. One of these lists dates from the time of the Mandate (1924), another one, which harks back to the first, was compiled in connection with the Israeli law for the protection of holy places of 1967. Neither of these lists refers to the Temple Mount as a Jewish holy place, whereas the 1924 British declaration mentions the Western Wall as a place holy to Jews, as well as to Muslims, though they refer to it as Al Buraq.
The possibilities of conflict arising from the ambiguities in these vague formulations of holy places and their protection are endless. For example, does "freedom of access" also entail freedom of worship? How does this work when the same place is sacred to the members of more than one religion or to the members of different sects within one of the religions? The latter problem, namely, regulating the rights of different Christian sects in the Holy Sepulcher, was the task of the original "status quo" decree of the Ottomans, issued in a Firman of 1852 and written into the international peace treaty of 1856, following the Crimean War. When we speak of the "status quo" in the holy places, this is really the only one that has ever been written into law. In regard to every other place, including the Western Wall/ Al Buraq, the Temple Mount, and many lesser known places, it remains unclear what constitutes desecration and to whom. The fact that "feelings" are mentioned as well makes the matter even more complicated and volatile. Who is to protect the feelings, the rights of access, and the freedom of worship and where exactly-all of these things are left open and hence provide infinite possibilities for conflict.
In recent years, it has been the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif that has become the flashpoint where Jewish freedom of access, Jewish freedom of worship, and Jewish religious rights and sentiments have become a test case for the protection of religious freedom in Jerusalem.15 It is here more than anywhere else that Jewish and Muslim claims are in immediate conflict and the Israeli government finds itself in a position to mediate between traditional religious rules and sentiments, neo-fundamentalist claims, and modernist conceptions of religious freedom and equal rights. It is illuminating that the conflict over Jewish access to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif has become fully virulent since the possibility arose, during Camp David II, that Israel might yield sovereignty over the Temple Mount to the Palestinian Authority.
Jewish access to this sensitive site is today advocated mostly by religious settler communities and the parties that represent them for reasons in which religious sentiments and convictions are intermingled with the neo-Zionist desire for a decisive change in the status quo at one particular holy place, the Temple Mount, which is overly charged with messianic expectations. 16 Read in this light and realizing that the presence of Muslim holy places in the most sacred place of Judaism may well violate the religious sentiments of many of the most devout Jews, the Jerusalem Basic Law has become a potential mandate not for the preservation and protection of the status quo but for its ultimate, messianic rectification.
Paragraph 4 a) mandates the Government to "provide for the development and prosperity of Jerusalem and the well-being of its inhabitants by allocating special funds, including a special annual grant to the Municipality of Jerusalem (Capital City Grant) with the approval of the Finance Committee of the Knesset." Paragraph 4 b) prioritizes Jerusalem "in the activities of the authorities of the State so as to further its development in economic and other matters." Paragraph 4 c) mandates the Government to "set up a special body or special bodies for the implementation of this section."
The vagueness of the definition of territory when speaking of Jerusalem "complete and united", gave occasion-at a time when the redivision of the city was on the table during the Camp David negotiations between Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat in 2000, brokered by then-US President Bill Clinton-to add two provisions to the law as parts of Amendment 1, passed by the Knesset on 27 November 2000, two days before the anniversary of the UN Partition Vote of 1947. The two provisions are:
Paragraph 5 "The jurisdiction of Jerusalem includes, as pertaining to this basic law, among others, all of the area that is described in the appendix of the proclamation expanding the borders of municipal Jerusalem beginning the 20th of Sivan 5727 (28 June 1967), as was given according to the Cities' Ordinance." This clause disambiguates to some extent the definition of Jerusalem as "complete and united" that the original version of the Basic Law had left somewhat ambiguous.
Paragraph 6, finally, makes the territory of Jerusalem within the municipal boundaries determined since 28 June 1967, inalienable: "No authority that is stipulated in the law of the State of Israel or of the Jerusalem Municipality may be transferred either permanently or for an allotted period of time to a foreign body, whether political, governmental or to any other similar type of foreign body."
Clearly this stipulation, which echoes language that had been first introduced by Geulah Cohen but omitted from the 1980 version of the law, means to forestall as unconstitutional any compromise on the sharing of sovereignty within the expanded boundaries of Jerusalem with a future Palestinian state, as discussed at the failed Camp David negotiations and envisaged by subsequent peace proposals, such as that proposed by the Geneva Initiative.17
Finally, Paragraph 7 stipulates that the clauses added by the Amendment "shall not be modified except by a Basic Law passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset."
CONCLUDING ANALYSIS
The pieces of legislation briefly discussed here, issued at different times and by different legislatures, are largely of a symbolic nature in the sense that they did not introduce new subjects into the law of their respective countries but merely stated facts that were already widely assumed to be the case, or-as in the Embassy Law-required the US Government to act on what was widely assumed to be the case. The change required by the latter, i.e., the moving of the US Embassy from its current location in Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem, was also of a largely symbolic, though costly, nature. In the case of the "Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel", costs play a role as well. The symbolic acts of recognition of the city of Jerusalem mandated by these laws were to be accompanied and underscored by future expenditures, explicitly mandated and authorized by these laws.
As a biblical scholar and historian of the religions that consider Jerusalem a holy city, I am reminded of two antecedents to these modern pieces of legislation, namely the authorization of King Josiah, upon reaching adulthood, to spare no expense on the renovation of the Solomonic temple (see 2 Kings 22:1-7), an act and an attitude that nets this late Judahite monarch the highest praise the Bible lavishes on any king;18 and the authorization of Caliph Abd al-Malik b. Marwan to build the Dome of the Rock, with no expenses spared. 19 The idea and the mandate to build Jerusalem is deeply embedded in the biblical imagination that seems to play itself out in the modern readers of the ancient Psalms and prayers that urge the building Jerusalem.20 Modern Jerusalem-legislation, American and Israeli, is driven by biblical mandates and antecedents, whether they are explicitly mentioned or not.
Both laws discussed here constitute political statements in the form of legislative acts. Were these acts merely descriptive of the status quo or were they also in some sense prescriptive? The Jerusalem Embassy Act was prescriptive in the sense that it mandated the US Government to accept, acknowledge, and act on what had long since been the status quo. The Administration has resisted this, not just on constitutional grounds that have since been debated, but also on policy grounds: US policy in regard to the location of its embassy is inconsistent with diplomatic practice anywhere else; in this regard the US Congress was right in its findings. But US policy in regard to Jerusalem is consistent with statements made by all US Governments since 1967, namely, that the US remains committed to a negotiated settlement of the final status of Jerusalem and until that time maintains that the status of Jerusalem in international law is that of a corpus separatum, as determined by the 1947 UN Partition Resolution. Changing US policy before a negotiated settlement has been reached for Jerusalem would be a premature and problematic departure from stated US policy. A further political calculation may be that such a move would aggravate US-Arab relations and compromise the role of the US as an international broker.
And yet, by spelling out a broad popular American consensus on Jerusalem, the Jerusalem Embassy Act puts the US on a clear trajectory toward favoring Israel's view of itself as uniquely attached to Jerusalem and uniquely qualified to serve as an arbiter of religious freedom in Jerusalem, a role that has since been underscored by various congressional measures and public gestures on the part of US lawmakers, who periodically commend Israel for maintaining democracy and religious freedom. This is somewhat at odds with the emphasis on Judaism's prerogative with regard to Jerusalem, which introduces a contradiction. US law now supports the goal of keeping the city as a whole under Jewish sovereignty because of two mutually contradictory reasons: Judaism's spiritual prerogative and Israel's established practice of providing equal access to and protection of the holy places, for all "ethnic religious" communities. It is interesting that the latter, i.e., keeping Jerusalem united and the protection of religious rights for all, is also the explicit mandate of the Jerusalem Basic Law, while the formeri.e., the Jewish spiritual prerogative-is not an explicit part of Israeli law.
On the other hand, there is no doubt that the Israeli lawmakers fundamentally agree with the assertion that the Jews have a longer and deeper connection with Jerusalem than anyone else who lays claim to it, and that they felt, as Ben-Gurion expressed it in his 1949 speech to the Knesset, that Jerusalem was the "innermost heart" of the Jewish State of Israel. Here are Ben-Gurion's words, in translation:
We see fit to state that Jewish Jerusalem is an organic, inseparable part of the State of Israel, just as it is an integral part of Jewish history and belief. . . . Jerusalem is the heart of the State of Israel. We are proud of the fact that Jerusalem is also sacred to other religions, and will gladly provide access to their holy places and enable them to worship as and where they please, cooperating with the U.N. to guarantee this. We cannot imagine, however, that the U.N. would attempt to sever Jerusalem from the State of Israel or harm Israel's sovereignty in its eternal capital.21
It is noteworthy that Ben-Gurion, while surely speaking of the idea of Jerusalem as such, was satisfied with establishing the capital of Israel in West Jerusalem.
The fact that we have similar and related, though by no means identical or concurrent, laws passed by Israeli and US legislatures is of considerable interest. While this parallel indicates something about the "special relationship" between Israel and the US, the fact that the US government has not followed up on the Embassy Act indicates that the status of Jerusalem is not just contested but remains unstable and in flux as long as its final status has not been determined by internationally recognized agreements. This is not in and of itself a reason for the US not to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital or to maintain its embassy elsewhere. As Ruth Lapidot has pointed out, there is precedent (she specifically cites the American representation to East Berlin) for the US to maintain a mission in the place of government of a host country, while clarifying its position in a written deposition that explains what such a diplomatic presence does or does not entail. Yet the city's legal status remains contested and unresolved and Jerusalem's status quo as Israel's undivided capital remains in question, which is precisely why these largely symbolic laws were passed in the first place. 
